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I. INTRODUCTION
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the Code) governs se-
cured transactions in personal property and fixtures.' When more than
one creditor has a security right in the same piece of collateral, the Ar-
ticle 9 rules of priority determine the order in which each creditor may
satisfy his claim.2 The creditor with the highest priority rank gets paid
first, and, if his claim exceeds the amount of the proceeds, junior credi-
tors take nothing.s Consequently, creditors want to determine their pri-
ority rights in collateral before extending credit. If one creditor
determines that another creditor will have priority over its security in-
terest, then it may wish to require substitute collateral or to increase
the interest rate for the loan. Priority rules should be uniform and
readily determinable so that creditors can allocate their risks in ex-
tending credit and adjust the terms of the credit accordingly.
Because of disagreement among the courts, however, the priority
rules governing interests in returned or repossessed goods are neither
uniform nor readily determinable.4 The split among the courts centers
on whether, under Section 9-306(5) of the Code, a perfected inventory
financer5 subordinates an unperfected chattel paper financer6 The fol-
1. U.C.C. § 9-101 comment (1987). Unless otherwise noted, all Code references will be to the
1987 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code.
2. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301 to -318 (Article 9's priority rules).
3. See U.C.C. § 9-504.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. For the purposes of this Note, inventory financers are creditors who secure credit with the
debtor's current and future inventory.
6. For the purposes of this Note, a chattel paper financer is a purchaser of chattel paper. See
U.C.C. § 9-308 (outlining the necessary steps to purchase chattel paper and at the same time
subordinate other security interests).
The split among the courts can also be characterized as a disagreement on whether inventory
financers should be defined as creditors or purchasers for the purposes of § 9-306(5)(d). If subsec-
tion (5)(d)'s definitions are read to exclude inventory financers, then, regardless of perfection,
chattel paper financers' security interests are protected from competing interests held by inventory
financers. See infra subpart IV (A). Articles addressing the split in authority and ways to amend
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lowing example illustrates a typical situation in which priority conflicts
arise.7
Dealer Bulldozer Company (Dealer) could not afford to purchase
the inventory of bulldozers it needed directly from the manufacturer
and applied to Inventory Finance Company (Inventory Finance) for a
one million dollar loan. Because Inventory Finance did not believe
Dealer was established well enough to extend it an unsecured loan, In-
ventory Finance required a security interest in Dealer's current and af-
ter-acquired inventory as collateral.8 Inventory Finance took all the
necessary steps to perfect its interest in Dealer's inventory through
filing.9
On February 1, Dealer sold six bulldozers, one-third of its inven-
tory, to Joe's Construction Company (Joe's) for $600,000. Joe's paid
Dealer $100,000 down and signed a long-term note-"chattel paper"
under Section 9-105(1)(b) of the Code'°-that granted Dealer a security
interest in the bulldozers. Inventory Finance had a perfected security
interest in the chattel paper as proceeds from the sale of the collateral
on its loan.1
Without immediate cash Dealer could not replenish its inventory.
Dealer realized that the payments from Joe's on the long-term note
would not meet its immediate cash needs. In hope of alleviating its
cash-flow problem, Dealer contacted the Paper Finance Company (Pa-
per Finance), a purchaser of commercial paper, which agreed to
purchase the chattel paper. On February 1, Dealer received a cashier's
check for $425,000, and Paper Finance *took possession of the chattel
paper. Under Section 9-308 of the Code, Paper Finance gained priority
over Inventory Finance's perfected security interest in the chattel
the Code include Barnes, Reaffirming the Dominance of Notice in Article 9: A Proposed Modifica-
tion of Priorities in Returned or Repossessed Goods, 48 U. Pirr. L. REv. 353 (1987), and Skilton &
Dunham, Security Interests in Returned and Repossessed Goods Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 17 WLLAmErrE L. REv. 779 (1981).
7. The basic fact pattern and names of some of the parties in this example come directly
from an article by Professor Richard Barnes. See Barnes, supra note 6, at 357-59.
S. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of perfection through filing, see infra notes 29-32 and accompanying
text.
10. Article 9 defines chattel paper as a writing or writings that evidence a monetary obliga-
tion and a security interest. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b).
11. When the debtor disposes of collateral through sale, the secured party gains a security
interest in the property given in exchange. U.C.C. § 9-306(1), (3). In this example, because the cash
down payment and the chattel paper were the proceeds of the sale of the bulldozers, Inventory
Finance had a security interest in both. See id. The security interest in the chattel paper was
perfected automatically for at least 10 days, and would have been perfected for longer had Inven-
tory Finance filed a financing statement covering the inventory in the same office in which a fi-




By April 1, Joe's had missed three payments to Dealer. 3 On" April
2, a group of Paper Finance's repossessors descended stealthily on Joe's
and repossessed the six bulldozers. 4 After the repossession, Dealer
asked Paper Finance to bring the bulldozers to Dealer so it could try to
resell them. On April 3, Paper Finance delivered the bulldozers to
Dealer and took no subsequent steps to perfect its security interest in
the bulldozers. The bulldozers remained on Dealer's lot for five months
but none were sold. During this period, Dealer became indebted deeply
to a number of unsecured creditors. Dealer also missed several install-
ments on its note with Inventory Finance. Realizing that Dealer could
not repay the note, Inventory Finance repossessed all the bulldozers on
Dealer's lot as partial satisfaction of Dealer's debt. Paper Finance, how-
ever, claimed priority over Inventory Finance in the six bulldozers for-
merly owned by Joe's. Unable to reach an agreement, the parties went
to court to resolve their priority dispute.
Section 9-306(5) of the Code governs priority disputes between se-
cured creditors over returned or repossessed goods such as the six bull-
dozers.' 5 Subsection (d) of Section 9-306(5) provides that either
creditors of the seller or purchasers of the returned goods may
subordinate an unperfected chattel paper financer.16 Some courts have
held that inventory financers are creditors of the seller and, thus, may
subordinate an unperfected chattel paper financer. 7 Other courts, how-
ever, have held that sound commercial policy requires the exclusion of
inventory financers from the protection of subsection 5(d). 18 These
courts have concluded that an unperfected interest in returned goods
held by a chattel paper financer subordinates a perfected inventory fi-
nancer.' 9 As the case law demonstrates, a court's interpretation of sub-
12. See U.C.C. § 9-308(b). The text of § 9-308(b) appears infra at note 44. See also infra
notes 72-79 and accompanying text (outlining the elements of § 9-308).
13. For the purposes of this example, the missed payments constitute a default on the mone-
tary obligation.
14. The Code gives Paper Finance the right to repossess collateral upon Joe's default without
recourse to the courts provided that the repossession does not breach the peace. See U.C.C. § 9-
503.
15. U.C.C. § 9-306(5). See infra note 39.
16. In the example, Inventory Finance represents the secured creditor discussed in § 9-
306(5)(a). Paper Finance represents the chattel paper transferee discussed in § 9-306(5)(b). Dealer
represents the debtor referred to throughout § 9-306.
17. See, e.g., Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Clark Equip. Credit Corp., 724 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1984);
Finance Am. Corp. v. Galaxy Boat Mfg. Co., 292 S.C. 494, 357 SE.2d 460 (1987).
18. See, e.g., International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 133 Ga. App.
488, 211 S.E.2d 430 (1974); J.L Case Co. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 669 S.W.2d 543 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1984).
19. See cases cited supra note 18.
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section (5)(d) often determines the outcome of a priority dispute
between a chattel paper financer and an inventory financer.
This Note addresses the proper interpretation of subsection (5)(d).
Part II of this Note outlines the framework of relevant Code sections.
Part III explains the status and rights of both the chattel paper fi-
nancer and the inventory financer. Part IV examines the different judi-
cial responses to Section 9-306(5)(d). Part V reviews the different
methods of interpretation courts have used in applying subsection
(5)(d). This Note concludes that Section 9-306(5)(d) encompasses in-
ventory financers and, thus, that an inventory financer may subordinate
an unperfected chattel paper financer.
II. EXPLORING THE RuLEs OF PRIORITY
A. Secured and Unsecured Creditors
The Code establishes two general categories of creditors: secured
creditors and unsecured creditors.20 A secured creditor takes an interest
in the debtor's collateral to ensure payment or performance of an obli-
gation.21 If the debtor defaults on the obligation, the secured creditor
may satisfy the debt through retention or disposal of the collateral.22
An unsecured creditor, however, has nothing to ensure repayment of a
debt beyond the solvency of the debtor and the right to reduce the
claim to judgment.23
All security interests are effective against the debtor.24 To ensure
that its security interest is effective against other creditors, however,
the secured party must perfect that interest.25 Perfection occurs when
the creditor takes a security interest in the debtor's property and sup-
plies constructive notice to other creditors that the security interest ex-
ists.2 6 Article 9 provides two alternate modes of perfection: perfection
by filing2 7 and pledge perfection.2 8
20. The terms are mutually exclusive. A secured creditor has collateral and an unsecured
creditor does not. See U.C.C. § 9-105(m) (stating that a secured party is a creditor with a security
interest).
21. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
22. U.C.C. §§ 9-503, -504(1), -505(2).
23. Article 9 protects unsecured creditors only after they have reduced their claims to judg-
ment. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (providing that lien creditors subordinate unperfected secured
creditors).
24. U.C.C. § 9-203(2). Before an agreement is classified as a security interest it must attach.
U.C.C. § 9-303 comment 1. Attachment occurs when a security agreement has been executed, the
creditor has given value, and the debtor has rights in the collateral. U.C.C." § 9-203(1).
25. See U.C.C. § 9-303 comment I (noting that "in general after perfection the secured party
is protected against creditors and transferees of the debtor and in particular against any represen-
tative of creditors in insolvency proceedings instituted by or against the debtor").
26. U.C.C. §§ 9-302, -304 to -306.
27. U.C.C. § 9-302(1); see U.C.C. §§ 9-401 to -402 (outlining the procedure for filing).
1991] 1105
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To protect a security interest through filing, the secured party
must meet Article 9's filing requirements.29 First, the secured party
must obtain a written financing statement from the debtor that con-
tains the names and addresses of the debtor and the secured party, de-
scribes the collateral by item or type, and includes the debtor's
signature."' Next, the creditor must file the financing statement in the
appropriate filing office.3 1 At the office, a clerk will index the financing
statement under the debtor's name so that a reasonable credit search
will reveal the financing statement and, thus, the perfected creditor's
security interest in the debtor's property. In this manner, the perfected
creditor notifies prudent second-comers of its security interest.
32
In most cases, the pledge, or perfection through possession, pro-
vides an alternative mode of perfection. The pledge is a common-law
device that the Code expressly retains.3 4 To pledge collateral, the se-
cured party or an agent of the secured party takes possession of the
collateral away from the debtor.35 Perfection continues as long as the
secured party controls the collateral e.3  Because a reasonable creditor
should inquire why an asset of the debtor is no longer in the debtor's
control, the pledge will reveal the security interest and notify subse-
quent creditors that the debtor has encumbered the pledged property.
Both modes of perfection supply notice of a secured creditor's interest
and make necessary financial information concerning the debtor's assets
available to the prudent creditor.
B. Sections 9-301(1) (a) and 9-306(5): Rules of Priority
Creditors want perfected, rather than unperfected, security inter-
ests. Comment 2 of Section 9-301 states that, "a fortiori," a perfected
security interest takes priority over an unperfected security interest,3 7
28. U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1)(a), -305 (establishing rules for pledge of collateral).
29. See U.C.C. §§ 9-401, -402.
30. U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
31. To determine which state law governs the rules of filing, see U.C.C. § 9-103. To deter-
mine where to file within the appropriate state, see U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (providing three alternatives
from which the states may choose).
32. The purpose of the filing system set forth in Article 9 is to notify creditors of the debtor's
prior liens. See U.C.C. § 9-205 comment 3.
33. U.C.C. § 9-304 comment 1. When negotiable instruments or cash serve as collateral, pos-
session of the collateral is the sole method of perfection. U.C.C. § 9-304(1). Perfection through
pledge also eliminates the need for a written and signed security agreement. U.C.C. § 9-203 com-
ment 1.
34. Sections '9-304(1) and 9-305 codify the common-law device of perfection by possession.
See U.C.C. § 9-305 comment 1.
35. U.C.C. § 9-305.
36. Id.
37. U.C.C. § 9-301 comment 2.
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and a perfected security interest in collateral extends to the proceeds of
collateral.3 8 Section 9-306 outlines the requirements for maintaining a
perfected security interest in proceeds. Subsection (5) of Section 9-306
addresses the comparative rights of inventory financers and chattel pa-
per financers in returned and repossessed goods 9 and is organized into
subparts that govern the rights of these creditors.
Subsection (5)(a) governs the rights of inventory financers who
have extended credit to the seller using the seller's inventory as collat-
eral.40 If the inventory financer has a perfected security interest in
goods when they are sold, then upon return or repossession of the
goods, the creditor's security interest reattaches and reperfects pro-
vided that the creditor still has an effective financing statement. 1
Subsection (5)(b) governs the rights of chattel paper financers,
such as Paper Finance, who have purchased chattel paper that results
from a sale of goods.'2 Subsection (5)(b) gives the chattel paper financer
a security interest in the goods upon their return or repossession.43 If
the chattel paper financer meets the requirements of Section 9-308,"
38. Proceeds include whatever is received upon disposition of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-
306(1).
39. Section 9-306(5) provides in part:
(5) If a sale of goods results in an account or chattel paper which is transferred by the
seller to a secured party, and if the goods are returned to or are repossessed by the seller or
the secured party, the following rules determine priorities:
(a) If the goods were collateral at the time of sale, for an indebtedness of the seller which
is still unpaid, the original security interest attaches again to the goods and continues as a
perfected security interest if it was perfected at the time when the goods were sold. If the
security interest was originally perfected by a filing which is still effective, nothing further is
required to continue the perfected status; in any other case, the secured party must take
possession of the returned or repossessed goods or must file.
(b) An unpaid transferee of the chattel paper has a security interest in the goods against
the transferor. Such security interest is prior to a security interest asserted under paragraph
(a) to the extent that the transferee of the chattel paper was entitled to priority under Section
9-308.
(d) A security interest of an unpaid transferee asserted under paragraph (b) or (c) must
be perfected for protection against creditors of the transferor and purchasers of the returned
and repossessed goods.
U.C.C. § 9-306(5) (emphasis added).
40. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a).
41. Id.
42. Subsection (5)(b) refers to the purchaser of the chattel paper as the "transferee" of the
paper. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b). To fall within this section the transferee must remain unpaid. Id.
Furthermore, the subsection separates transferees into two groups: transferees who meet the re-
quirements of § 9-308 and transferees who do not. Id. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying
text.
43. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b).
44. Section 9-308 provides:
A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives new value and takes possession of it
in the ordinary course of his business has priority over a security interest in the chattel paper
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1101
the subsection deems the chattel paper financer's security interest prior
to that of a subsection (5)(a) inventory financer.45 Subsection (5)(d)
also addresses the rights of the chattel paper financer and provides that
either creditors of the seller or purchasers of the goods may subordinate
a chattel paper financer's unperfected interest in returned or repos-
sessed goods.46
The introductory example47 helps clarify the provisions of Section
9-306(5). Inventory Finance had a perfected security interest in the
bulldozers at the time of the sale to Joe's. Because subsection (5)(a)
applies to parties who have security interests in goods at the time of
sale, subsection (5)(a) governs Inventory Finance's security rights.48 Pa-
per Finance purchased the chattel paper, and the underlying obligation
of the chattel paper remains unpaid. Subsection (5)(b) applies to par-
ties who are unpaid transferees of chattel paper, so subsection (5)(b)
governs the rights of Paper Finance.49
Under subsection (5)(a) Inventory Finance has a perfected security
interest in the repossessed bulldozers, 5  and under subsection (5)(b) Pa-
per Finance has a security interest in the bulldozers.51 As long as Paper
Finance had possession of the bulldozers it had a perfected security in-
terest.5 12 When it transferred the bulldozers to Dealer's lot, however, Pa-
or instrument
(a) which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing and temporary perfection) or
under Section 9-306 (perfection as to proceeds) if he acts without knowledge that the specific
paper or instrument is subject to a security interest; or
(b) which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest (Sec-
tion 9-306) even though he knows that the specific paper or instrument is subject to the
security interest.
U.C.C. § 9-308.
45. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b). It is important to note that subsection (5)(b) does not say that the
chattel paper financer has priority over the subsection (5)(a) creditor. Subsection (5)(b) states
merely that a subsection (5)(b) security interest is "prior" to that of a subsection (5)(a) creditor.
Id. A security interest may be prior to one interest and still be subordinate to another. See U.C.C.
§ 9-301(1)(a) (providing that an unperfected interest is subordinated by a later perfected interest
regardless of when either interest attached); U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (providing that priority between
perfected security interests is determined by which party is the first to file or perfect and that the
timing of attachment of interests has no bearing on priority).
46. Subsection (5)(d) refers to the rights granted to the creditor by subsection (5)(b). U.C.C.
§ 9-306(5)(d).
47. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
48. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a).
49. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b).
50. Under subsection (5)(a) creditors have perfected interests if they have an effective fi-
nancing statement that covers the returned goods. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a). Because a filed financing
statement remains effective for five years, U.C.C. § 9-403(2), Inventory Finance's original financing
statement remains effective until five years from the date of filing. Therefore, Inventory Finance
regains a perfected security interest in the repossessed and returned bulldozers.
51. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b).
52. U.C.C. § 9-305.
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per Finance lost its perfected status because it neither filed a financing
statement nor had possession. Therefore, under subsection (5)(d),
Dealer's other creditors and purchasers of the collateral may
subordinate Paper Finance because Paper Finance has not maintained
a perfected interest in the six bulldozers. Whether inventory financers
like Inventory Finance are creditors or purchasers under subsection
(5)(d) is the issue that divides the courts. How the courts resolve this
issue will determine whether Inventory Finance or Paper Finance has
priority in the repossessed bulldozers.
III. THE PARTIES
In order to understand better the priority conflict between chattel
paper financers and inventory financers, one must explore the status
and rights of each party.
A. Chattel Paper Financers
Chattel paper is a writing or writings that evidence both a mone-
tary obligation arising from the sale or lease of goods and a security
interest in the goods.5 8 Financing secured by chattel paper is one of the
more confusing methods of finance because of the schizophrenic person-
ality of chattel paper. Although chattel paper is nonnegotiable, Article 9
has given it at least one quasi-negotiable feature.54 Similar to negotiable
instruments, which cannot be perfected through filing, notice filing of
chattel paper may not protect creditors against the rights of subsequent
financers. 55 Furthermore, chattel paper financers derive payment rights
from two distinct sources: a monetary obligation and a security interest
in goods.5 6 While the chattel paper reflects a security interest in goods,
it is unclear whether the chattel paper embodies the actual goods.5 7 Ex-
amining these distinctions in greater detail provides a better under-
standing of Section 9-306(5).
53. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b).
54. See Barnes, supra note 6, at 387-89 (discussing the negotiable quality of chattel paper);
Jackson, Embodiment of Rights in Goods and the Concept of Chattel Paper, 50 U. CHL L. REV.
1051, 1058-61 (1983) (same).
55. See U.C.C. § 9-308 (providing that a subsequent chattel paper financer can subordinate a
filed interest in chattel paper).
56. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b). Chattel paper arises when a party purchases goods on credit from a
seller who retains a security interest in the goods. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) comment 3; U.C.C. § 9-
308 comment 1. The writing or writings that evidence the purchaser's debt and the security inter-
est are chattel paper. Id. § 9-105(1)(b). The chattel paper financer has the right to receive the
purchaser's installment payments on the debt, and, if the purchaser defaults, the chattel paper
financer may repossess the goods. See id. § 9-504(1).
57. See infra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
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1. The Quasi-Negotiable Nature of Chattel Paper
Possession is the only mode of perfecting negotiable instruments. 8
A creditor in possession of negotiable instruments need not search filing
offices to ensure that no competing security interests exist, but instead
must establish its rights by taking possession of the instruments in
question.5 9 In this way, the flow of credit increases because the credi-
tor's confidence in the collateral increases.00 Although the Code retains
filing as a mode of perfection for interests in chattel paper, in certain
instances, perfection through possession may subordinate perfection
through filing, regardless of constructive notice.6 1 Thus, Article 9 grants
chattel paper one quasi-negotiable feature.2
This quasi-negotiable aspect of chattel paper is necessary for retail
businesses." Retailers often finance their inventory through floating
liens. 4 An inventory financer with a floating lien automatically gains a
perfected security interest in the retailer's new inventory.65 Because an
inventory financer subordinates all subsequent nonpurchase money in-
ventory financers,66 subsequent creditors seldom rely on inventory as
collateral 6 7 A credit crunch may thus arise when inventory is the re-
58. U.C.C. § 9-304(1). Instruments, however, may be perfected temporarily without posses-
sion. U.C.C. § 9-304(4)-(5). In part, temporary perfection allows the secured creditor to deliver the
instrument to the debtor so that specific acts, such as collection, may be performed without the
threat of subordination. See U.C.C. § 9-304 comment 4 (explaining the reasons for temporary
perfection).
59. Jackson, supra note 54, at 1060.
60. Id.
61. See U.C.C. § 9-308(b) (providing that knowledge of the competing security interest does
not subordinate the chattel paper financer).
62. See Barnes, supra note 6, at 387-89; Jackson, supra note 54, at 1058-61.
63. See Barnes, supra note 6, at 392.
64. For a discussion of inventory financers and retailers, see infra notes 111-16 and accompa-
nying text.
65. U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
66. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (providing that the perfected creditor that is first to file or per-
fect has priority).
67. See Panel Discussion, A Practical Approach to the Uniform Commercial Code for the
Practicing Lawyer, 19 Bus. LAW. 20, 52 (1963). A variation of the example clarifies the problem
faced by subsequent inventory financers. Suppose Inventory Finance gave only one dollar secured
by its perfected security interest over Dealer's inventory, which is worth $500,000. Three weeks
later Acme Finance lent Dealer $400,000 in exchange for a subsequent interest in Dealer's inven-
tory. Acme knew of Inventory Finance's prior interest but disregarded it because the interest se-
cured only one dollar. One day later Inventory Finance made an additional advance of $499,999
secured by the inventory. The original security agreement and financing statement now secures
Inventory Finance's total debt of $500,000, see U.C.C. § 9-204 comments 1 and 5 (providing that a
security agreement may cover subsequently incurred obligations without the need for further
agreement), and Inventory Finance's interest subordinates Acme's interest for the entire amount
of the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (providing that a prior perfected interest subordinates later
interests). Thus, Acme foolishly relied on the original debt of one dollar when Inventory Finance,
through future advances, could continually increase the amount of its senior interest.
1110
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tailer's most valuable asset and the original inventory financer with-
holds future advances.
A retailer's extension of long-term credit to its buyers exacerbates
the credit problem. Because long-term credit entails payment in smaller
installments, the retailer may experience cash-flow problems and, thus,
needs an efficient way to convert chattel paper into money or new
value. Even here, however, the inventory financer's supremacy appears.
The inventory financer automatically gains a security interest in chattel
paper as proceeds.6 8 To protect retailers from the power of inventory
financers, the Code, through Section 9-308, developed a method of fi-
nancing that both converts chattel paper into cash or new value and
avoids the inventory financer's security interest in proceeds.69
Under Article 9 both filing and possession are modes of perfecting
a security interest in chattel paper.70 Normally, when the Code allows
perfection either through filing or by possession, the two are equivalent
alternatives.71 Section 9-308, however, runs counter to this presump-
tion. Under this Section a subsequent purchaser of chattel paper who
meets specified requirements subordinates the perfected security inter-
est of an inventory financer.7 2 To qualify, the purchaser must purchase
chattel paper in the ordinary course of his business73 and must give new
value for, and take possession of, the chattel paper.74 The purchaser,
however, can avoid only a chattel paper security interest that an inven-
tory secured creditor claims as the proceeds of inventory. 75 If the inven-
tory financer claims the interest merely as the proceeds of inventory,
the chattel paper purchaser prevails whether or not the purchaser is
68. U.C.C. § 9-306(1)-(3). The Code defines proceeds as whatever a party receives on disposi-
tion of collateral or on disposition of proceeds already received from an earlier disposition of col-
lateral. U.C.C. § 9-306(1). For example, if a diamond ring serves as collateral for a debt and the
debtor trades the ring for a motorcycle, the motorcycle is the proceeds of the ring. Under § 9-
306(1), the creditor would be entitled to claim the motorcycle as collateral in lieu of the ring. If the
debtor then sells the motorcycle for cash, the creditor likewise would be able to claim the cash
proceeds of the sale as collateral.
69. The primary purpose of chattel paper financing is the injection of new value into busi-
nesses. See Barnes, supra note 6, at 366.
70. U.C.C. §§ 9-304(1), -305.
71. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (setting forth the general priority rule for competing perfected
creditors). If Creditor A perfects through filing and Creditor B perfects through possession, prior-
ity goes to A if A filed before B took possession. Id. Likewise, priority goes to B if B took posses-
sion before A filed. Id.
72. In the example, supra note 71, A had priority over B when A filed before B took posses-
sion. Id. Under § 9-308, however, even when A, the inventory financer, files first, B, the chattel
paper financer, may subordinate A by a later possession of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-308.-





aware of the competing security interest.7 6 Otherwise, the chattel paper
purchaser prevails only if it lacks knowledge of the inventory financer's
security interest." In this situation, however, constructive notice does
not suffice to show knowledge.' If the chattel paper purchaser meets
the specified requirements, possession of chattel paper determines pri-
ority.7 ' In this way, chattel paper assumes negotiable features.8 0
The inventory financer is the obvious target of the quasi-negotiable
nature of chattel paper.8 l Ideally, however, Section 9-308 does not harm
the inventory financer8 2 If the retailer uses the new value to replace
inventory, then the inventory financer has a security interest in the new
inventory. 3 Furthermore, if the inventory financer wants its debt paid
directly from the new value, then the inventory financer may include a
provision in the security agreement requiring the retailer to turn over
the new value.8 4 Finally, the inventory financer can eliminate any possi-
bility of chattel paper financing by taking possession of the chattel pa-
per or, if appropriate, by stamping the chattel paper.8 5
In the introductory example, 8 if Inventory Finance did not want to
lose its security interest in the chattel paper, Inventory Finance should
have taken possession of the paper. Inventory Finance also could have
structured its security agreement into a form known as a floor plan,17
under which Inventory Finance would have had more control over
Dealer. Either of these alternatives would reduce the potential role and
concomitant threat of a chattel paper financer, such as Paper Finance.
76. U.C.C. § 9-308(b).
77. U.C.C. § 9-308(a) & comment 3.
78. See U.C.C. § 1-201(25)-(27) (defining knowledge and notice); see also 2 G. GILMORE, SE-
IURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 21.6, at 591 (1965).
79. G. GmMORE, supra note 78, § 27.3, at 728.
80. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
81. An inventory financer is the party who invariably will gain a security interest in chattel
paper as proceeds. Section 9-308 avoids this interest.
82. Barnes, supra note 6, at 366.
83. See supra note 68 (describing the movement of a security interest through disposition of
collateral and proceeds of collateral).
84. Barnes, supra note 6, at 366-67. The inventory financer, however, must police the collat-
eral to ensure that the retailer complies with the security agreement. Id.
85. U.C.C. § 9-308 comment 3 (explaining that inventory financers may stamp or otherwise
note their interest on the chattel paper as direct notice to subsequent creditors).
86. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
87. For an excellent description of an inventory financer "floor plan," see Chemical Bank v.
PIC Motors Corp., 87 A.D.2d 447, 452 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1982), af'd, 58 N.Y.2d 1023, 448 N.E.2d 1349,
462 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1983).
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2. Embodiment and Proceeds Theories
Chattel paper embodies two rights: a right to the account debtor's
payments and a security interest in goods.8 The primary obligation on
which a chattel paper financer relies is the account debtor's payment.8 9
The financer desires a steady flow of money, not the troubles associated
with the acquisition and disposal of collateral. For this reason, one com-
mentator describes the security interest in goods as an ancillary right
that serves primarily to increase the value of the chattel paper.90 The
extent to which the security rights of chattel paper embody returned or
repossessed goods, however, has caused considerable confusion.9
A brief discussion of negotiable documents92 best explains the con-
troversy surrounding the embodiment theory of chattel paper. Under
Article 9, as long as a negotiable document is outstanding, the docu-
ment "locks up" the title to the goods, and the proper way to perfect an
interest in the goods is to perfect an interest in the negotiable docu-
ment.93 Thus, for the purposes of secured transactions, Article 9 makes
a negotiable document the legal equivalent of the goods in which the
document represents an interest. 4
The embodiment theory of chattel paper posits that chattel paper
similarly should lock up the title to the goods underlying the paper.
Under this theory, a chattel paper secured creditor should need to per-
fect only its interest in the chattel paper to perfect its interest in the
underlying goods. 5 In contrast, the nonembodiment theory requires a
holder of chattel paper to perfect its interest in the goods themselves in
order to protect that interest from subordination.
If the embodiment theory were correct, however, ostensible owner-
ship problems would arise. Chattel paper financers who perfect solely
through possession of the paper give no other external indicia of their
interests in returned goods possessed by the dealer or debtor. The
dealer has complete dominion over the goods, and no financing state-
88. U.C.C. § 9-105(b).
89. Barnes, supra note 6, at 388-89. In the introductory example, supra notes 7-15 and ac-
companying text, Joe's is the account debtor.
90. Jackson, supra note 54, at 1058.
91. Barnes, supra note 6, at 389.
92. A negotiable document arises when a bailee controls goods and, in the regular course of
business, issues a writing that lists the goods and provides that the person in possession of the
writing is entitled to possession of the listed goods. U.C.C. § 1-201(15); id. § 9-105(1)(f).
93. U.C.C. § 9-304 comment 2.
94. Id.
95. Jackson, supra note 54, at 1057-67 (addressing the conflicting views of chattel paper
embodiment).
96. Id.
97. See Barnes, supra note 6, at 393-403.
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ment exists to alert creditors that the dealer does not own them.98 Be-
cause the dealer's other creditors have no reliable, independent means
of discovering the security interest in the returned or repossessed goods,
these creditors cannot allocate risks accurately. The commercial neces-
sity of protecting creditors from this form of ostensible ownership or
secret lien, therefore, argues against a strict embodiment theory.99
Priority rules should not allow the chattel paper financer to cure
the ostensible ownership problem simply by filing a financing statement
identifying the chattel paper. Although filing of an interest in chattel
paper would notify creditors that encumbered chattel paper exists,
creditors still would not know what goods gave rise to the chattel pa-
per.'0 Therefore, a prudent creditor must incur the additional expense
of investigating just what goods the chattel paper embodies to ensure
that portions of a dealer's inventory are not returned goods covered by
a chattel paper financer's superior interest. The cost of such investiga-
tion, however, undesirably increases finance costs. 01
Under both embodiment and nonembodiment approaches, the
chattel paper financer has the same burden: to file a financing state-
ment to cure the ostensible ownership problem. The embodiment ap-
proach, however, also burdens nonchattel paper creditors with the duty
of investigating the extent to which chattel paper embodies the goods
that the dealer offers as collateral. Because the nonembodiment view
requires a description of returned or repossessed goods in the chattel
paper financer's financing statement, other creditors need not incur the
expense of investigating the status of chattel paper. The nonembodi-
ment view is more economically efficient, and for this reason commenta-
tors concur that chattel paper should not embody the underlying
goods. 102
Commentators, however, continue to debate whether returned or
repossessed goods are proceeds of chattel paper.0 3 Their debate focuses
98. In contrast, the chattel paper financer's possession of the paper provides adequate no-
tice of the financer's interest in the paper itself. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
99. See Barnes, supra note 6, at 384-86 (addressing the elimination of ostensible ownership
through Article 9).
100. Jackson, supra note 54, at 1065.
101. Id. One goal of Article 9 is the reduction of financing costs. U.C.C. § 9-101 comment.
The embodiment theory is counterproductive to this goal because it increases costs by forcing
creditors to conduct independent investigations of chattel paper.
102. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 6, at 394 (observing that "extending. . . embodiment to
rights in the goods may go further than necessary to protect commercial expectations"); Jackson,
supra note 54, at 1087 (suggesting that "the justification for embodiment lasts only so long as the
[dealer] is out of possession of the collateral").
103. Proceeds are whatever the dealer receives upon the disposition of collateral or the dispo-
sition of proceeds stemming from the original collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1). Thus, proceeds are
property received in substitution for the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 2(a).
1114 [Vol. 44:1101
1991] PRIORITY BATTLE 1115
on the need to reform Section 9-306(5).104 Professors Skilton and Dun-
ham, for example, argue that returned or repossessed goods are pro-
ceeds of chattel paper 10 5 and that the general rules applicable to
proceeds also should govern priority in returned or repossessed goods. 106
Under this view, the priority rules of Section 9-306(5) are unnecessary,
and, thus, Professors Skilton and Dunham advocate their elimination
from the Code.107
Professor Barnes, however, argues that returned or repossessed
goods are not proceeds of chattel paper. 08 He maintains that Section 9-
306(5) plays the important role of giving a security interest in the re-
turned or repossessed goods to the chattel paper financer whereas the
general rules applicable to proceeds would not do so. 09 Nevertheless,
Professor Barnes acknowledges that Section 9-306(5) is drafted poorly
and, thus, recommends that it be amended for the sake of clarity. 110
The debate concerning the necessity of Section 9-306(5), however,
does little to aid the courts in their interpretation of priority rights.
Section 9-306(5) exists and, regardless of its benefit or detriment to the
chattel paper financer, continues to govern priority in returned or re-
possessed goods. To protect its interests in returned or repossessed
goods, a chattel paper financer must fulfill the perfection requirements
of Section 9-306(5)(d).
Under the rules applicable to proceeds, a security interest in collateral continues in proceeds
of that collateral. U.C.C. § 9-306(2); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text. If the security
interest in the original collateral is perfected, then the security interest in the proceeds is perfected
temporarily. U.C.C. § 9-306(3). Under appropriate circumstances, perfection in proceeds continues
beyond the temporary period. Id.
104. When the goods in question are returned or repossessed goods, commentators recognize
that the priority rules of § 9-306(5) supersede any general priority rules applicable to proceeds.
Barnes, supra note 6, at 412 (acknowledging that § 9-306(5) controls transactions involving re-
turned or repossessed goods); Skilton & Dunham, supra note 6, at 805 (observing that "Section 9-
306(5) sometimes dictates results. . . that would not be achieved if [the general rules applicable to
proceeds] were the sole point of reference"). Commentators discuss the relationship between pro-
ceeds and returned or repossessed goods in order to understand better how more efficient priority
rules might be drafted. Barnes, supra note 6, at 416-18 (proposing a modification of § 9-306(5));
Skilton & Dunham, supra note 6, at 857-58 (concluding that better priority rules would eliminate
§ 9-306(5)).
105. Skilton & Dunham, supra note 6, at 803.
106. Id. at 857-58.
107. Id. (noting the opinion of the authors that "Article 9 would have been better if there
had been no subsection (5)").
108. Barnes, supra note 6, at 412 (arguing that "it is, at the very least, an enormous stretch-
ing of the concept of proceeds to say the 'destruction' of the security interest in the goods. . . is a
disposition of the chattel paper").
109. Id.
110. Id. at 416-18.
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B. Inventory Financers
1. After-Acquired Property Clauses and the Floating Lien
Wholesalers and retailers buy and sell inventory continually. If the
inventory financer's security interest cannot float onto future inventory,
its interest erodes as the debtor sells the original inventory. This ero-
sion causes the inventory financer to contract the line of credit. To off-
set this contraction Article 9 expressly provides for floating liens.111
The inclusion of an after-acquired property clause112 in a security
agreement creates a floating lien. Under this clause an inventory fi-
nancer gains a security interest in the retailer's future inventory that
relates back to the original security agreement and financing state-
ment."' This future security interest has equal status with the security
interest in the original collateral.114 Because the floating lien allows an
inventory financer to make future advances without fear of intervening
security interests, it speeds the flow of credit and, consequently, bene-
fits the debtor as well as the inventory financer.
The floating lien, however, also provides an opportunity for credi-
tor overreaching. 115 Because the lien subordinates intervening interests,
subsequent creditors will not rely on the burdened inventory as collat-
eral. As a result, an unscrupulous inventory financer may be able to
wrench unfair concessions from the debtor by threatening to dry up the
line of credit."'
Article 9 recognizes this potential for abuse and attempts to safe-
guard the debtor. Purchase money secured parties, 17 for example, can
subordinate the inventory financer's security interest in purchase
money inventory.18 Allowing this subordination facilitates the debtor's
search for additional inventory purchase money. The Code, however,
does not leave inventory financers completely at the mercy of debtors
and purchase money secured parties. To take priority, not only must
111. U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
112. Property acquired by the debtor after the execution of a security agreement can serve as
collateral for the debt if the parties so stipulate. The Code uses the term "after-acquired collat-
eral" to describe the property subject to a floating lien. Id.
113. See id. (stating that the secured party need not obtain a supplemental agreement cover-
ing the new collateral).
114. U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 1.
115. Id.
116. See supra note 67.
117. U.C.C. § 9-107 defines a purchase money security interest as follows:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to
enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so used.
118. U.C.C. § 9-312(3).
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purchase money secured parties perfect, but they also must send writ-
ten notice outlining their security interests to the inventory financer. 119
These requirements ensure that the inventory financer has complete in-
formation on which to base decisions regarding future extensions of
credit and other financing matters involving the debtor.1 20 Thus, while
the Code protects debtors by providing alternate avenues of financing,
it also protects the inventory financer by requiring direct notification of
potentially prior interests.
Section 9-308 also weakens the inventory financer's potential con-
trol over the debtor.12 1 If a purchaser of chattel paper meets the prereq-
uisites of Section 9-308,122 the purchaser's interest subordinates a
security interest held by an inventory financer. Thus, the Code helps
advance the common goals of purchase money financing and chattel pa-
per financing: infusing new value into the business community and
avoiding the inventory financer's interest. Section 9-306(5) supplies the
priority rules for returned and repossessed goods.
2. The Inventory Financer and Section 9-306(5)
Under Section 9-306(5)(a) an inventory financer regains a security
interest in returned or repossessed goods, and the interest continues as
a perfected security interest if a filed financing statement is still effec-
tive.128 Section 9-306(5)(b), however, curtails the rights granted under
subsection (5)(a) by granting a chattel paper financer a security interest
in the same goods. 24 Furthermore, if the chattel paper financer meets
the requirements of Section 9-308, then subsection (5)(b) deems his se-
curity interest prior to the inventory financer's interest.125
Subsection (5)(d), however, circumscribes the rights subsection
(5)(b) grants to the chattel paper financer. Subsection (5)(d) provides
that a chattel paper financer must perfect its security interest to
subordinate the interests of the retailer's other creditors or purchasers
of the retailer's goods. 126 The courts, however, disagree about whether
the inventory financer is a creditor or purchaser under subsection
119. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b)-(d).
120. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3.
121. See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
123. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a). When goods financed by an inventory financer are sold to a buyer
in the ordinary course of business, the buyer takes the goods free of the inventory financer's inter-
est. U.C.C. § 9-307(1). If for any reason, however, the buyer returns the goods or the seller or the
chattel paper financer repossesses them, § 9-306(5)(a) reinstates the inventory financer's security
interest in the goods. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a).
124. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b).
125. Id.
126. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(d).
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Without reference to the various policy justifications that some
courts have used to alter general definitions of the Code when applied
to specific sections,128 the inventory financer is obviously a creditor of
the retailer. Furthermore, careful analysis of the Code reveals that the
inventory financer is also a purchaser of the returned or repossessed
goods.12 9 Section 1-201(33) defines a purchaser as one who takes by
purchase, °30 and Section 1-201(32) defines "purchase" as a voluntary
transaction creating an interest in property. 3 ' The inventory financer's
security interest arises from a voluntary transaction that creates a prop-
erty interest in the retailer's inventory" 2 and, pursuant to Section 9-
306(5)(a), an interest in returned or repossessed goods. As a result, an
inventory financer is a purchaser of returned or repossessed goods.133
Consequently, a strict reading of Section 9-306(5)(d) leads to the con-
clusion that an inventory financer is both a creditor and a purchaser.
The split among the courts turns on whether policy considerations
merit an alteration in the general definitions of creditor and purchaser
in order to exclude inventory financers from subsection (5)(d).
IV. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 9-306(5)(d) BY THE COURTS
Commentators agree that an inventory financer is not a creditor or
a purchaser within the meaning of Section 9-306(5)(d). 3 " The courts,
however, have divided when faced with the same issue. This section ex-
amines a representative case from each side of the split.
A. Chattel Paper Financer As Victor
In Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equipment, Inc.35
the court resolved a priority dispute that arose between a perfected in-
127. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., infra subpart IV(A) (discussing the judicial justification for excluding inven-
tory financers from § 9-306(5)(d)).
129. See In re Samuels & Co. Inc., 526 F.2d 1238, 1241 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub
nom. Stowers v. Mahon, 429 U.S. 834 (1976) (observing that under a "meticulous and dispassion-
ate reading" of the Code, one must conclude that a purchaser includes a secured creditor with a
floating lien such as the inventory financer).
130. U.C.C. § 1-201(33).
131. U.C.C. § 1-201(32).
132. See U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (noting that contracts create Article 9 security interests).
133. All courts agree that an Article 9 secured creditor is a "purchaser" of the collateral
under § 1-201(32)-(33) of the Code. See, e.g., In re Bowman, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 738,
742-43 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1978); see also U.C.C. Case Dig. 1201.33 (Callaghan 1986).
134. See, e.g., 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 78, § 27.5; Barnes, supra note 6, at 367; Skilton &
Dunham, supra note 6, at 805-06; Note, Priority Contests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Purposive Interpretation of A Statutory Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1155 (1986).
135. 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 980, afl'd on rehearing, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Cal-
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ventory financer and a chattel paper financer. Lynnwood Equipment
(LEI) was a retail dealer of heavy logging and construction equip-
ment.136 Northwest Acceptance Corporation (Northwest) financed and
had a perfected floating lien in all of LEI's inventory. 37 When LEI sold
equipment, the transactions often resulted in chattel paper that Seat-
tle-First Bank (Seattle-First) purchased. When a customer defaulted on
the chattel paper, Seattle-First sometimes would repossess the equip-
ment; otherwise, LEI would repossess and hold the equipment for re-
sale. " 8 Seattle-First, however, failed to perfect its interest in the
repossessed goods held by LEI."3 9 Northwest brought suit to establish
its priority in LEI's inventory and Seattle-First counterclaimed for pri-
ority in the goods that once were subject to its chattel paper, including
priority in the equipment that had given rise to the defaulted chattel
paper.14 0
The court addressed the issue of priority under subsection (5)(d) in
two separate opinions: Northwest P41 and Northwest IL"J  2 In North-
west I the court acknowledged that the outcome of the dispute turned
on the court's interpretation of subsection (5)(d) and addressed the
question of whether Northwest was a creditor under Section 9-306(5)(d)
of the Code.143 Relying primarily on a treatise by Professor Grant Gil-
more which concluded that subsection (5)(d) excluded inventory
financers, the court held that, for the purposes of subsection (5)(d),
Northwest was not a creditor of LEI."4
In Northwest II the court addressed whether Northwest was a pur-
chaser of the goods under subsection (5)(d). The court acknowledged
that, under some circumstances, an inventory financer may be a pur-
chaser of returned goods under Article 2,148 but found that, for purposes
of subsection (5)(d), the definition of purchasers excluded inventory
laghan) 1710 (W.D. Wash. 1986), afl'd on other grounds, 841 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1988).
136. 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 982.
137. Id. at 981.
138. Id. at 982.
139. The court actually did not reach the issue of whether Seattle-First perfected its interest
in the goods repossessed by LEI. Id. at 982 n.3. The court indicated that even if Seattle-First was
unperfected the resolution of the case would be the same. Id. Therefore, the court implicitly as-
sumed that Seattle-First was unperfected, the worst-case scenario for Seattle-First, when deter-
mining priority in the goods.
140. Id. at 980-81.
141. Id. at 980.
142. 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1710.
143. 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 983-84.
144. Id. at 984. The court referred to G. GmMORE, supra note 78.
145. 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1710-11 & n.1.
146. Id. at 1711 n.1.
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financers.147 The court based its conclusion on the Code's goal of facili-
tating chattel paper financing and discounted the danger that secret
liens may dupe inventory financers into giving new value based on col-
lateral already encumbered by an unknown chattel paper financer. 14 8
Instead, the court believed that inventory financers were in a position
to monitor the secured inventory, and, thus, that inventory financers
bore the risk if they extended value based on encumbered inventory.149
B. Inventory Financer As Victor
In Crocker National Bank v. Clark Equipment Credit Corp.1 50 the
Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. Doyle-Lunstra Equip-
ment Company (DLE) was a retailer of heavy equipment. 51 Clark
Equipment Credit Company (Clark) was DLE's inventory financer.152
DLE's sales of inventory frequently produced chattel paper and Credit
Alliance Corporation (Alliance) provided secondary financing to DLE
by purchasing the chattel paper. 53
DLE sold a loader on credit, and Alliance purchased the chattel
paper from the sale.154 Eventually, the buyer defaulted, and Alliance
repossessed the loader and returned it to DLE.15 5 Alliance did not file a
financing statement covering the loader15 and, therefore, had an un-
perfected security interest. After taking control of DLE's inventory,
however, Clark had a perfected interest in the loader.
In determining who had priority in the loader, the court focused its
analysis on subsection (5)(d) and noted that commentators, including
Professor Gilmore, had interpreted subsection (5)(d) to exclude inven-
tory financers.L57 The court, however, found that interpretation of the
Code by commentators, although instructive, could not prevail over the
plain wording of the statute. 15 Subsection (5)(d) protected creditors of
DLE from Alliance's unperfected interest. 5 9 Because Clark was a credi-
tor of DLE, the court concluded that, under subsection (5)(d), Clark's
(the inventory financer's) perfected interest subordinated Alliance's
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1711; see supra notes 61-83 and accompanying text.
149. Id. at 1711.
150. 724 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1984). Crocker involved disputes over a number of items involv-
ing various parties. This Note examines only the priority dispute between Alliance and Clark.
151. Id. at 697.
152. Id.
153. Id.





159. Id. at 700.
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(the chattel paper financer's) unperfected interest.1 0 Professor Barnes
describes the court's approach as the plain meaning interpretation of
subsection (5)(d). e1
V. RULES OF THE GAME: INTERPRETING SECTION 9-306(5)
Professor McDonnell has stated that judicial interpretation based
on strict adherence to the plain meaning of a Code section amounts to
judicial legislation aimed at effectuating the court's goals, not the
Code's goals."' 2 He recommends an interpretation of the Code that
seeks the underlying purposes of each particular section as revealed by
statutory language, the Official Comments, and statutory history. 63
Other commentators, however, employ a more expansive interpretation
that includes inquiry into the overall purposes of the Code."6 ' This sec-
tion examines both methods of analysis. This section also investigates
the implications of the Bankruptcy Code in the interpretation of Article
9. Finally, this section considers the continuing influence of Professor
Gilmore in current interpretations of Section 9-306(5).
A. Influences Under the Code
1. Exploring Statutory Language and the Official Comments
This analysis focuses on Sections 9-306(5) and 9-308, which Section
9-306(5)(b) incorporates by reference. Clearly, the primary purpose of
Section 9-308 is to develop a secondary financial market based on the
negotiable elements of chattel paper.1 15 Subordination of the primary
financial interest, that of the inventory financer, is the natural out-
growth of Section 9-308's developmental purpose. 6' Section 9-306(5)'s
purpose, however, is not as clear.
Section 9-306(5) attempts to preserve the priority relationships es-
tablished in Section 9-308.167 Subsection (5)(b) provides that the Sec-
tion 9-308 chattel paper financer's security interest in returned or
repossessed goods is prior to the inventory financer's security interest in
the same goods. 68 This subsection benefits the chattel paper financer
160. Id.
161. See Barnes, supra note 6, at 382.
162. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implica-
tions for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 853 (1978) (positing that courts following the
"plain meaning" of the Code actually are engaging in "surreptitious judicial legislation").
163. Id. at 853-54.
164. E.g., Note, supra note 134, at 1167.
165. See supra subpart Ill(A)(1).
166. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
167. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b) comment 4.
168. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b); see also supra note 45.
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by facilitating the growth of a secondary market in chattel paper and,
thus, reinforces the purpose of Section 9-308. The Official Comments to
Section 9-306(5) further reinforce this purpose by acknowledging that
Section 9-308 governs the priority rights in returned or repossessed
goods." 9 Although the Official Comments fail to indicate whether the
chattel paper financer must perfect its interest in order to protect its
position over the inventory financer, subsection (5)(d) indicates that the
chattel paper financer must perfect to retain priority. 70
Critics of this interpretation argue that allowing inventory
financers to gain priority in returned goods under Section 9-306(5)(d)
destroys the effect of Section 9-306(5)(b).' 7 Certainly, any interpreta-
tion of subsection (5)(d) that nullifies subsection (5)(b) is untenable be-
cause such an interpretation would reduce subsection (5)(b) to
surplusage. Nevertheless, one must question whether including inven-
tory financers within the definition of a subsection (5)(d) creditor or
purchaser truly renders subsection (5)(b) meaningless.
Some commentators, and arguably the drafters of Article 9, believe
that returned or repossessed goods are neither proceeds of the chattel
paper nor embodied in the chattel paper. 2 Under this view, absent the
provisions of subsection (5)(b), the chattel paper financer would not
have an interest in returned or repossessed goods in the dealer's posses-
sion. Subsection (5)(b) grants the chattel paper financer its security in-
terest in these goods and this grant remains in place whether or not
subsection (5)(d) includes inventory financers.
Subsection (5)(b) also alters the general rule of priority among per-
fected creditors. Normally, the perfected party that is first to file or was
first to perfect has priority. 73 Subsection (5)(b), however, deems a per-
fected chattel paper financer's security interest first in time even when
an inventory financer's perfected interest actually arose first and, there-
fore, allows a perfected chattel paper financer to subordinate a preexist-
ing perfected inventory financer. 74 Without subsection (5)(b) the
priorities would reverse. 17 In this way, subsection (5)(b) continues to
play a role in the general framework of Section 9-306(5) whether or not
subsection (5)(d) includes the inventory financer. Thus, the plain mean-
169. Id. at comment 4.
170. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Note, supra note 134, at 1165 (arguing that subsection (5)(b) expressly pro-
vides that chattel paper financers meeting § 9-308's requirements always subordinate an inventory
financer).
172. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
173. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5).
174. U.C.C. §9-306(5)(b).
175. U.C.C. § 9-312(5). Without subsection (5)(b), the prior in time, prior in right provisions
of § 9-312(5) would govern the rights of the parties.
[Vol. 44:11011122
PRIORITY BATTLE
ing interpretation of Section 9-306(5)(d) need not destroy the efficacy of
subsection (5)(b).
Critics of the plain meaning approach also argue that the plain
meaning interpretation of subsection (5)(d) disrupts the growth of sec-
ondary markets in chattel paper. 17 6 If this is true, then the better inter-
pretation of subsection (5)(d) certainly would exclude the inventory
financer. An interpretation of subsection (5)(d) that includes inventory
financers, however, appears to have no such negative effect on the pru-
dent chattel paper financer.
Reasonable business practice mandates that chattel paper financers
file whether or not the inventory financers fall within subsection (5)(d),
and a prudent chattel paper financer will file a financing statement
under the dealer's name describing the underlying goods as soon as the
chattel paper transaction begins. 17 7  Filing protects chattel paper
financers from subordination by other interests. If, for example, a judi-
cial lien covers the dealer's inventory, the lien creditor immediately
subordinates the unperfected chattel paper financer's rights in goods
returned to the dealer.1 8 Delayed filing also may lead to a preference
problem in bankruptcy.'79 Thus, immediate filing should be a standard
business practice, and the interpretation of subsection (5)(d) should not
alter the chattel paper financer's commercially reasonable course of
conduct. The restrictive interpretation of subsection (5)(d) merely shel-
ters negligent chattel paper financers from some of the adverse conse-
quences of failing to file. This is hardly the purpose of Section 9-306(5)
or the Code. 80 The plain meaning interpretation of subsection (5)(d)
better accords with the purposes of Section 9-306(5).
2. Article 9 and the Code Purposes Applicable to Section 9-306(5)
The overarching aim of Article 9 is to provide a simple and unified
structure within which secured transactions can go forward with in-
176. See, e.g., Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Clark Equip. Credit Corp., 724 F.2d 696, 700 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1984). In an unusual move, Chief Judge Lay, the author of the majority opinion in Crocker,
dissented from one point in his own opinion in a footnote. The judge stated that allowing subordi-
nation of an unperfected chattel paper financer would add elaborate procedures and expense to the
financer's transaction costs. For a discussion of Crocker, see supra subpart IV(A).
177. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 78, § 27.5, at 738 (observing that good business practice
requires the chattel paper financer to file a financing statement covering returned or repossessed
goods in order to be protected from other creditors of the debtor).
178. Subsection (5)(d) clearly gives a lien creditor priority over the unperfected chattel paper
financer. U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(d); see also Skilton & Dunham, supra note 6, at 845-47.
179. See Note, supra note 134, at 1173-75.
180. As a general rule of priority, failure of a secured creditor to follow the rules of perfection
results in subordination to a competing perfected creditor. U.C.C. § 9-312(5). Therefore, to hold
that a negligent creditor deserves priority runs counter to the basic priority principle of the Code.
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creased certainty and diminished cost."" To achieve unity the drafters
replaced the hodgepodge of pre-Code financing statutes with an Article
applicable to all secured transactions in personal property and fix-
tures.'82 To increase certainty and decrease cost the drafters supplied a
"liberal sprinkling of hard and fast rules" so that a financer could de-
termine its rights in a projected loan quickly and easily.8 3 Because pri-
ority affects the financer's allocation of risks, clear and concrete rules
are well suited to Article 9's priority provisions.18 4 Nevertheless, clarity
evaporates when courts divide over the meaning of a Code section. To
benefit the business community, courts should strive toward uniformity
when selecting an appropriate method of interpretation.
a. Where to Find a Code Purpose: The Conflict Among Uniformity,
Policy, and Equity
The Code seeks to unite the commercial law.85 A unified system of
law decreases administrative costs by permitting financers to lend
money without undergoing the onerous and expensive task of familiar-
izing themselves with the laws of numerous states. A unified system
also increases certainty because the financer is better able to gain mas-
tery over a single system of law than the numerous individual systems
that the drafters of the Code designed it to replace. Despite the Code's
overarching goal of uniformity,"" independent judicial systems still
must administer it in the varying forms enacted by the states. 87 The
inability of any one court to make interpretations binding in all juris-
dictions places limits on the Code's aspirations of unity.
Helping to counteract these obstacles, the Code has several fea-
tures that promote unity. The general structure of the statute confines
the interpretations of the various jurisdictions 88 and averts some fun-
damental differences in the law of secured transactions. Independent
judicial interpretations of the Code still may lead to variations in the
181. U.C.C. § 9-101 comment.
182. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 9-102 (defining the scope of Article 9).
183. Everett, Securing Security, 16 LAW & CONTP. PROns. 49, 52 (1951).
184. See id. at 51 (stating that a financer should be able to calculate rapidly his rights in a
projected loan and that concrete rules aid this purpose).
185. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (stating that the Code's "underlying purposes and policies.., are
... to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions").
186. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (stating that the Code's underlying purpose is to "sim-
plify, clarify, and modernize" commercial law).
187. In some sections, the Code ihcludes various options from which state legislatures may
select. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-401(1), (3) (providing options for determining the proper place to file
security interests). Furthermore, because legislative adoptions of the Code are state law, each state
judiciary is free to interpret the Code independently.
188. Each court must begin at the same starting point-the statute itself. Therefore, to some
degree, the Code restrains variations in the commercial law.
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law, however. To minimize divergent interpretation, the drafters pro-
vided the Official Comments in addition to the text of the statute18 to
serve as a uniform guidepost for interpretation. In appropriate in-
stances, the Appendix also reviews prior law that the Code has altered,
and, when the Code has been amended, the Appendix generally enu-
merates the reasons for the changes. 190 Therefore, to some degree, the
Appendix helps provide a uniform statutory history of the Code. Em-
ploying a method of interpretation that coordinates these features of
the Code enhances its uniform interpretation and application.19'
In addition to these uniform elements of interpretation, some
courts and commentators also examine the commercial policies underly-
ing a particular Code section. 9 Some courts, for example, have relied
on specifically tailored policy considerations in interpreting Section 9-
306(5).1' Generally, the policy considerations chosen reflect a court's
view of an equitable interpretation of subsection (5).
A method of interpretation that attempts to achieve equity, how-
ever, often invites fragmented decisionmaking and damages uniformity.
Contemplations of fairness vary from judge to judge, and interpreta-
tions driven by equitable policies will vary in similar fashion. One
should question whether equitable policy considerations actually do
equity in the commercial law environment.
In a commercial environment an equitable approach should focus
on a method of interpretation that allows the business community to
predict accurately how a rule of law will operate. 9 Accurate predic-
tions, however, are difficult to make when policy considerations chosen
by the courts alter, rather than affect, the clear meaning of a Code sec-
189. For a discussion of the legal effects of the Official Comments, see Skilton, Some Com-
ments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 WIs. L. REV. 597, 598-606.
190. See ComPtacIAL & DEBTOR-CREDrroR LAW: SELECTED STATUTES 907-62 (D. Baird, T. Ei-
senberg & T. Jackson eds. 1989) (enumerating the reasons for the 1972 amendments to the Code).
191. See McDonnell, supra note 162, at 853-54 (formulating an interpretive approach to the
Code that focuses on the underlying purposes of specific sections).
192. See Note, supra note 134, at 1165-73 (expanding on the purposive approach by consid-
ering the Code's normative goals).
193. See Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Clark Equip. Credit Corp., 724 F.2d 696, 700 n.3 (8th Cir.
1984) (acknowledging that "[i]f this risk were not on the inventory financer, chattel paper purchas-
ers ... would be forced to go through elaborate and expensive auditing procedures"); Northwest
Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1710, 1711 (W.D.
Wash. 1986) (stating that the "underlying rationale of the Uniform Commercial Code [is] to pro-
tect the chattel paper holder who has given new value"); see also Note, supra note 134, at 1172-73
(maintaining that the inventory financer "has a comparative advantage in monitoring the debtor's
activities") aff'd on other grounds, 841 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1988).
194. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has observed: "Rules of law affecting parties to voluntary
arrangements do not operate 'inequitably' in the business world-at least not once the rule is




tion and its Official Comments. An interpretation of the Code that em-
phasizes its statutory language and the Official Comments best
enhances uniformity and, ultimately, commercial equity. Nevertheless,
interpretations of subsection (5)(d) continue to turn on individual judi-
cial impressions of underlying financial policies. 195 Therefore, a thor-
ough analysis of Section 9-306(5) requires an examination of the
purposes and policies that supposedly merit the subordination of the
perfected inventory financer under subsection (5)(d).
b. Subordinating Secret Liens: The Primacy of Perfected Security
Interests
At the heart of Article 9 is its use of notice requirements to elimi-
nate the threat of ostensible ownership.'96 Because a creditor who per-
fects through pledge or effective filing provides notice of its interest to
other creditors, subsequent creditors can take the prior interest into ac-
count when determining whether to extend credit and on what terms. 197
A secured creditor who does not supply notice, however, holds a secret
lien and, thus, has an unperfected interest. 98 A fundamental rule of
priority is that perfected security interests subordinate unperfected se-
curity interests.' 9 This rule increases certainty in the collateral because
it assures perfected creditors of their priority over secret lien holders.
The plain view interpretation of subsection (5)(d) adopts this
reasoning.200
When the unperfected chattel paper financer has not given con-
structive notice of its interest in returned goods, through either filing or
possession of the goods, the inventory financer has no independent
means of discovering the chattel paper financer's interest, and the chat-
tel paper financer has a secret lien. Under the plain view interpretation
the inquiry would end here, and the perfected interest would prevail.2 0'
For various policy reasons, however, some courts have concluded that
the inventory financer does not require the notification rights enjoyed
by all other creditors of the retailer and, with respect to inventory
financers, have inverted the general rule that perfected security inter-
195. See sources cited supra note 193.
196. See Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 687,
697-99 (1948) (arguing in favor of a notification filing system as the centerpiece of a uniform secur-
ity law).
197. See supra subpart 11(A).
198. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
199. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(a) & comment 2.
200. The inventory financer should not be subordinated by a possibly unknown lien when the
inventory financer was not given constructive notice through possession of the goods by the chattel
paper financer or through filing.
201. See cases cited supra note 17.
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ests subordinate unperfected security interests. 2
The courts base this abnormal subordination on the unique status
of the inventory financer.0 s Many inventory financers maintain a great
deal of control over the debtor and the collateral.0 4 The financer is
often in a position to know of the debtor's activities even when the
debtor gives no formal notice. This situation leads courts and commen-
tators to conclude that an inventory financer knows of a chattel paper
financer's rights in returned goods whether or not the latter has per-
fected.20 5 Under this view inventory financers do not require construc-
tive notice because of their superior position and their supposed ability
to guard against unperfected interests.0 e
This reasoning, however, contains several flaws. First, until a court
alters a Code section through policy interpretation, creditors are likely
to rely on the plain meaning of the statute. Even inventory financers
who know of the chattel paper financer's interest may not allocate
against the risk of subordination until after an initial court decision
grants priority to the unperfected chattel paper financer. °7 Second, the
conclusion that all inventory financers have complete control over the
debtor and awareness of the debtor's activities is an overgeneralization.
Nothing requires the inventory financer to take the debtor's collateral
hostage, and the degree of control over the debtor will vary from case to
case. 2 8 The conclusion that all inventory financers have de facto notice
of an unperfected interest is simply incorrect. Finally, the history of the
Code reveals its intent that a perfected security interest should
subordinate an unperfected security interest even when the perfected
party has knowledge of the competing interest.29 Therefore, the discus-
sion of subsection (5)(d) should not end with the conclusion that inven-
202. See sources cited supra note 193.
203. See Crocker Nat'l Bank, 724 F.2d at 700 n.3 (stating that the inventory financer merits
this detrimental treatment because it is better able to guard against the risk of subordination);
Northwest Acceptance Corp., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1711 (maintaining that "the
inventory financer is in a position to monitor the inventory when it is returned or repossessed and
can thus protect against the danger" of the secret lien); see also Note, supra note 134, at 1172-73
(arguing that "[b]ecause the [inventory financer] literally holds the debtor's assets 'hostage,' he
has a comparative advantage in monitoring the [dealer's] activities. . . that gives rise to priority
contests").
204. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
205. See sources cited supra note 203.
206. See sources cited supra note 203.
207. In other words, until each jurisdiction has interpreted subsection (5)(d), inventory
financers may be unable to determine their rights in returned or repossessed goods.
208. See Note, supra note 134, at 1172 (describing the inventory financer as holding the
collateral "hostage"). One must remember that inventory financers may vary widely in sophistica-
tion and experience. An inventory financer can be anyone: a bank, a relative, or a nonprofit group.
All that is needed is money and a security interest.
209. See infra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
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tory financers lose priority simply because they may have knowledge of
an unperfected interest. Instead, the Article 9 sleuth should investigate
the priority relationships between the inventory financer and other
creditors in order to determine whether the drafters of the Code actu-
ally intended to dilute the notification rights of the inventory financer.
Purchase money financers, like chattel paper financers, are able to
subordinate the inventory financer's interest in certain pieces of collat-
eral. 10 If the restrictive interpretation of subsection (5)(d) is sound,
then the inventory financer knows of the purchase money financer's in-
terest, regardless of filing, because the inventory financer has complete
control over the collateral. Under this reasoning, inventory financers al-
ways can protect themselves from unknowingly advancing undersecured
credit. Thus, purchase money financers should not have to perfect their
interests to subordinate the inventory financer. The Code, however, re-
jects this conclusion. 21
Under Section 9-312(3)(a) the purchase money financer must per-
fect its security interest before the debtor takes possession of the collat-
eral or the inventory financer subordinates the purchase money
financer's interest.2 2 The purchase money financer also has other re-
sponsibilities. Under Section 9-312(3)(b) the purchase money financer
must send written notification of its conflicting security interest to the
inventory financer,21' and if the purchase money financer fails to pro-
vide notice, the inventory financer subordinates even a perfected
purchase money financer.1 4 The extra notification requirement reflects
the Code's fear that an inventory financer, relying on its floating lien,
will not recheck the filing offices before making future advances to the
debtor.215 These special notification requirements protect the inventory
financer from making undersecured advances. 26 The framework of the
Code, therefore, supports the view that the inventory financer requires
greater notification rights than other creditors.21 7
210. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (providing that "a perfected purchase money security interest in
inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same inventory").
211. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a).
212. Id.
213. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b). The purchase money financer must give notice before the date of
filing or the beginning of a temporary perfection period. Id. Furthermore, the inventory financer
must receive the notice at least five years before the debtor takes possession of the purchase
money collateral. § 9-312(3)(c). The notice must describe the affected collateral by item or type.
§ 9-312(3)(d).
214. U.C.C. § 9-312(3). Nevertheless, a perfected purchase money interest that arises before
the inventory financer perfects its interest still subordinates the inventory financer. U.C.C.
§ 9-312(3)(a).
215. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3.
216. Id.
217. In addition to the purchase money secured parties, consignors who would have a prior-
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The policy conclusion that an inventory financer does not merit
even constructive notice from the chattel paper financer is misguided.
The drafters structured the Code to safeguard the inventory financer
from an overreliance on the collateral. By eliminating the requirement
of perfection by the chattel paper financer, courts strip away all the
inventory financer's rights to notification by chattel paper financers.
Clearly, this result is at odds with the special treatment afforded the
inventory financer elsewhere in the Code. While the plain meaning of
subsection (5)(d) does not provide for written notification, it at least
supplies the basic notification rights currently enjoyed by all other
creditors. The better interpretation would place the inventory financer
within the protection of subsection (5)(d).
c. Allocation of Risks and Circularity
The Code's aversion to the secret lien stems from Article 9's goal of
enhanced certainty in the allocation of business risks.218 The secret lien,
however, is not the only enemy of certainty. When a circularity of rights
occurs, certainty also is lost.219 A modification of the introductory ex-
ample220 helps explain the problems presented by circularity. Suppose
that before Inventory Finance had an opportunity to repossess the bull-
dozers, Judgment Time Supply Co. (Judgment), a general creditor of
Dealer, obtained a judgment lien covering Dealer's inventory, including
the six returned bulldozers. 221 Thus, three parties-Inventory Finance,
Paper Finance, and Judgment-now claim priority in the six bulldozers.
If the court holds that the subsection (5)(d) definition of creditor or
purchaser excludes inventory financers, such as Inventory Finance, then
Paper Finance subordinates Inventory Finance. Judgment, however, is
clearly a creditor of Dealer. Since Paper Finance did not perfect its in-
terest in the six bulldozers, Judgment's lien has priority over Paper Fi-
nance's security interest. Inventory Finance's perfected security
interest, however, has priority over Judgment's lien because Inventory
Finance filed before the lien arose. Consequently, Inventory Finance
beats Judgment, Judgment beats Paper Finance, and Paper Finance
beats Inventory Finance. The priorities circle; all parties have both won
ity interest in the dealer's inventory must also take perfection-like steps and give notification to
the inventory financer. U.C.C. §§ 2-326(3), 9-114.
218. Barnes, supra note 6, at 407.
219. See 2 G. GiMoRE, supra note 78, § 39.1, at 1020-21 (observing that the problem of
circularity has caused a great deal of commentary;, yet the courts have rejected various solutions).
Professor Gilmore compares the judge faced with circularity to "a bull who has been goaded by the
picadors: he paws the ground and roars with rage." Id.
220. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.




The proceeds from the six bulldozers will not satisfy all three credi-
tors. The creditors must untangle their intertwined priorities in order
to determine the amount each party will receive from the collateral. If
the creditors cannot reach agreement on a priority scheme, then litiga-
tion is likely. Unfortunately, the courts have not developed a uniform
solution to circular priorities.222 Furthermore, judges often are unable to
find an equitable way to determine priority when the priorities circle.22 3
Protracted, costly litigation may ensue, and thus circularity decreases
certainty and increases cost, which is the inverse of Article 9's goal. The
better interpretation of the Code would eliminate circularity. Under the
plain meaning approach Inventory Finance subordinates Judgment as
well as Paper Finance.224 Thus, the plain meaning approach avoids cir-
cularity and better fulfills the Code's goals.
B. The Bankruptcy Code's Effect on Section 9-306(5)(d)
Bankruptcy courts routinely settle priority disputes. Therefore, an
examination of the effect of bankruptcy law on subsection (5)(d) can
provide guidance in determining whether a perfected inventory financer
should subordinate an unperfected chattel paper financer.225
In bankruptcy the trustee has the status of a lien creditor over all
the debtor's property.226 The trustee also may step into the shoes of an
existing unsecured creditor in order to avoid a competing security inter-
est.227 To explore the trustee's effect on the subsection (5)(d) priority
dispute, another modification of the introductory example228 will be
helpful.
Assume that before Inventory Finance had an opportunity to re-
possess, Dealer filed for Chapter 7 liquidation.2 9 Upon filing, the bank-
ruptcy trustee obtains the status of a lien creditor over all of Dealer's
222. See 2 G. GLMoRE, supra note 78, § 39.2, at 1023 (noting that "[tihere has never been
agreement on the correct solution of circular systems which arise .. from. . . inconsistent rules
of priority").
223. Id. § 39.1, at 1020-21 (noting that judges have great difficulty administering circular
priorities).
224. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5).
225. See Note, supra note 134, at 1173-76 (examining the trustee's role in § 9-306(5)(d)).
226. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1988).
227. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b). The trustee's avoiding powers allow the trustee to assume the status
of any existing unsecured creditor, and the trustee may use this status to subordinate any interest
the secured creditor could avoid. Id.
228. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text. During a liquidation under Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee collects and disposes of the debtor's assets and distributes the
proceeds to the creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 704.
229. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766.
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property.2 °0 Subsection (5)(d) applies to the trustee, as a creditor of
Dealer. Thus, Paper Finance must have perfected its interest in order
to protect its collateral from the trustee's competing claim, and the
trustee subordinates unperfected Paper Finance. The trustee, exercising
its avoiding powers, now may assume Paper Finance's rights against In-
ventory Finance."' If the plain meaning of subsection (5)(d) applies,
Inventory Finance subordinates the trustee as both a lien creditor and
as the embodiment of Paper Finance. 232 Therefore, Inventory Finance
has the primary interest. If, however, subsection (5)(d) excludes Inven-
tory Finance, the trustee, through its avoiding powers, can use Paper
Finance's rights to subordinate Inventory Finance.23 3 As a result, to the
extent of Paper Finance's interest, the trustee has complete priority.
Consequently, courts and commentators who argue for the exclusion of
inventory financers from subsection (5)(d) in order to benefit chattel
paper finance once again are misguided. Under bankruptcy law the
creditors who benefit from the restrictive interpretation of subsection
(5)(d) are the unsecured creditors. This interpretation both harms In-
ventory Finance and fails to benefit Paper Finance. With an eye to
bankruptcy, a plain meaning interpretation of subsection (5)(d) once
again is preferable.
C. The Power of Professor Grant Gilmore
Professor Gilmore's treatise on secured transactions234 has influ-
enced, and continues to influence, the courts' interpretations of Section
9-306(5).235 In his treatise Professor Gilmore concluded that subsection
(5)(d) should exclude inventory financers.3 6 Unfortunately, the courts
and commentators embracing Professor Gilmore's conclusion have ig-
nored the reasoning Professor Gilmore used to reach the conclusion. In
doing so, these courts and commentators have failed to notice that the
1972 amendments to the Code soundly rejected Professor Gilmore's rea-
230. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1).
231. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b); see supra note 227.
232. Inventory Finance subordinates the trustee's lien because Inventory Finance filed before
the lien arose. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (setting forth the first in time first in right rule). Further-
more, under the plain meaning of subsection (5)(d), Paper Finance does not subordinate Inventory
Finance. Therefore, the trustee gains no additional powers by stepping into Paper Finance's
position.
233. As a lien creditor the trustee's interest still is subordinated. Id. The trustee, however,
can now use Paper Finance's subsection (5)(b) rights to subordinate Inventory Finance. See U.C.C.
§ 9-306(5)(b); 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).
234. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 78.
235. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 669 S.W.2d 543, 546-47 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Professor Gilmore's treatise on secured transactions and reaching Profes-
sor Gilmore's conclusion that subsection (5)(d) excludes inventory financers).
236. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 78, § 27.5, at 738-39.
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soning, thus casting doubt on his conclusion.
Professor Gilmore based his interpretation of subsection (5)(d) on
his theory of lapse.287 A brief example illustrates the type of situation
that gives rise to lapse. Creditor A has a perfected security interest and
Creditor B has a junior perfected security interest in the same collat-
eral. Creditor A's financing statement lapses, leaving A unperfected. 23 8
Before the 1972 amendments, the statutory language of the Code did
not state expressly whether A lost priority to B after the lapse. The
Official Comments, however, clearly stated that B prevailed.23 9 Profes-
sor Gilmore believed this conclusion was unjust and rejected the
Comment. 40
Under Professor Gilmore's theory of lapse, A retained priority over
B.241 Professor Gilmore believed that B had allocated its risks with
knowledge of A's senior interest and, thus, that B should not profit
from A's lapse.242 Professor Gilmore buttressed his conclusion with an
analogy to lien creditors.243 At that time a lien creditor could not
subordinate an unperfected interest of which the lien creditor had
knowledge.2 " Professor Gilmore extrapolated that B should not
subordinate A because B had knowledge of the interest.24" Professor
Gilmore carried the reasoning over to his interpretation of subsection
(5)(d).2 e Because the inventory financer should have known of the
chattel paper financer's senior interest in the paper, Professor Gilmore
concluded that a lapse in the interest as to the returned goods should
not alter the original priorities.4 Therefore, inventory financers should
take a subordinate interest because of their prior knowledge.
The 1972 amendments to Article 9 squarely reject Professor Gil-
more's theory of lapse and, thus, the reasoning behind his interpreta-
tion of subsection (5)(d). First, the amendments to Section 9-403(2)
expressly give priority to a junior creditor, Creditor B, upon lapse.248
237. Id. at 739. For Professor Gilmore's theory of lapse, see 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 78, §
21.6.
238. U.C.C. § 9-403(2).
239. U.C.C. § 9-403 comment 3 (1962).
240. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 78, § 21.6, at 589.
241. Id.
242. Id. (comparing the ascendance of the junior interest to gambling, i.e., "a game of
roulette").
243. Id. at 590-91.
244. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1962).
245. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 78, § 21.6, at 590-91.
246. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 78, § 27.5, at 739.
247. Id.
248. The drafters amended § 9-403(2) to include the following language: "If the security in-
terest becomes unperfected upon lapse, it is deemed to have been unperfected as against a person
who became a purchaser or lien creditor before lapse." U.C.C. § 9-403(2). See COMMERCIAL &
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The drafters, therefore, placed into the statutory language the gist of
the Official Comment rejected by Professor Gilmore. Second, the
amendments to Section 9-301(1)(b) expressly eliminate knowledge as a
factor in subordinating a lien creditor.24e Thus, the premise of Professor
Gilmore's analogy to the lien creditor no longer exists. The 1972 amend-
ments to the Code have undermined Professor Gilmore's reasoning
against the plain meaning of subsection (5)(d). Thus, a court that em-
phasizes Professor Gilmore's subsection (5)(d) policy conclusions is
adopting reasoning that is no longer valid. Finally, the 1972 amend-
ments re-emphasize the cardinal rule that a perfected security interest
takes priority over an unperfected security interest.2 50 Consequently,
the 1972 amendments to the Code offer indirect support for the plain
meaning interpretation of subsection (5)(d).
VI. CONCLUSION
A chattel paper financer must perfect its interest in returned or
repossessed goods for protection from creditors of the retailer or pur-
chasers of the goods. Because the definitional sections of the Code de-
fine an inventory financer as both a creditor and a purchaser, a strict
interpretation of Section 9-306(5)(d) would include the inventory fi-
nancer. If all courts followed a plain meaning interpretation, the split in
authority over subsection (5)(d) would not have occurred, but both
commentators and the courts have resisted the plain meaning method
of interpretation. At the heart of this view of statutory interpretation is
a belief that the drafters cannot give life to the purposes of the Code
merely through its statutory language. Even if courts adopt a purpose
method of interpretation, however, a perfected inventory financer
should still subordinate an unperfected chattel paper financer. Inclu-
sion of the inventory financer in subsection (5)(d) would eliminate the
ostensible ownership problems that occur when the unperfected fi-
nancer has priority. Subordination of the unperfected chattel paper fi-
nancer also avoids circular priorities.
Predictions that the plain meaning of subsection (5)(d) will stunt
chattel paper financing have proved to be unfounded. Reasonable busi-
ness practice requires immediate filing as to the goods by the chattel
paper financer regardless of the inventory financer's place within sub-
section (5)(d). Inclusion of the inventory financer will not alter the rea-
DEBTOR-CRErrOR LAW, supra note 190, at 950 (enumerating the changes in § 9-403(2) made by
the 1972 amendments).
249. The 1972 amendments to § 9-301 eliminate knowledge as a factor in lien creditor prior-
ity. See COMMERCIAL & DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 190, at 923-24.
250. U.C.C. § 9-301 comment 2.
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sonable chattel paper financer's course of conduct. Interpretations of
subsection (5)(d) based on either the plain meaning or the purposes of
the Code lead to the same conclusion: a perfected inventory financer
subordinates an unperfected chattel paper financer's interest in re-
turned or repossessed goods.
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